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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY
Cheryl A. Leanza*
The American work force no longer comports with the
picture envisioned by those who created the unemployment
compensation system in the 1930s. Although it was never
completely accurate, at one time an employer-employee re-
lationship could be described as based upon some unstated,
but fundamental, norms. By paying wages, the employer
received the services of a worker who was completely sup-
ported by his domestic situation. This worker had few inflexi-
ble responsibilities besides the ones placed upon him by his
employer. The worker's wife cared for his children, took care
of his elderly parents, cleaned his home, did his laundry, and
took charge of his social schedule. In exchange, the employer
paid a wage that was sufficient for the worker to support his
family. In a sense, by paying one salary, the employer ac-
quired the services of more than one worker. In addition to
obtaining the employee's services, the employer benefitted
from the worker's domestic network-the worker's wife and
family who kept the worker happy, healthy, and ready to
work. The work force does not fit this picture today, and, for
many people, it never has.'
Today, employers do not pay wages that support entire
families. Women do not limit their expertise to raising chil-
dren and making a home for their husbands. Men's attitudes
toward their attachment to the workplace are beginning to
reflect their domestic responsibilities. Many aspects of the
work force, however, have remained the same. For example,
our nation's agricultural workers continue to experience high
rates of unemployment between harvesting seasons, continue
to earn extremely low wages, and continue to be excluded from
most of our nation's social welfare programs just as they did
in the 1930s.
* B.A. 1991, Boston University; M.P.P. 1995, University of Michigan Rackham
Graduate School; J.D. 1995, University of Michigan Law School. Attorney, Federal
Communications Commission. All opinions are the author's.
1. For a discussion of the unemployment compensation system as reflective of
the "male norm," see Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A
Case Study on Unemployment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992). For a discussion of the "good worker" theory and unem-
ployment compensation, see Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link
Between Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1470-97 (1993).
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As part of the New Deal, the Roosevelt administration and
Congress created an unemployment insurance (UI) system.
Unemployment insurance was designed to help workers who
became unemployed through no fault of their own. The cre-
ators of the unemployment compensation system recognized
that a well-functioning economy would produce some unem-
ployment as inefficient companies closed, but decided that
individual families should not suffer because of marketplace
adjustments.2 In order to reduce incentives to quit an unde-
sirable job and collect unemployment insurance, the architects
of the UI system devised some tests which limit coverage.
These eligibility requirements have evolved over the years into
a morass of competing policy goals, political compromises, and
state-by-state variations which seldom result in the consistent
treatment of individuals despite the fact that their circum-
stances are the same.3
The UI system is based on a complex combination of feder-
ally mandated requirements, state regulations, and case law.
Federal and state laws impose eligibility requirements upon
potential beneficiaries. These requirements are typically cate-
gorized into two groups: monetary and nonmonetary.4 Mone-
tary eligibility requirements generally require that individuals
demonstrate a minimum connection to the work force by
working a minimum amount of time and earning a minimum
amount of money.5 Nonmonetary eligibility requirements are
designed to ensure that UI recipients: (1) are either involun-
tarily employed or voluntarily unemployed for good cause and
2. Economic analysts today maintain that a certain level of unemployment is
necessary for a well-functioning economy. See Stephen Bingham, Replace Welfare for
Contingent Workers with Unemployment Compensation, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 937,
939-40 (1995) (stating that the Federal Reserve Board considers a stable unemploy-
ment rate to be 6%, which supports a hidden unemployment rate of 12%).
3. Elizabeth F. Thompson, Comment, Unemployment Compensation: Women and
Children-The Denials, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 751, 758-60, 763-68 (1992); see also
Kenneth M. Casebeer, Unemployment Insurance: American Social Wage, Labor
Organization and Legal Ideology, 35 B.C. L. REV. 259, 311-20 (1994) (discussing the
competing policy goals and political compromises that underlie the unemployment
compensation system); Amy B. Chasanov, Remarks at Unemployment Compensation:
Continuity and Change Symposium Presented by the Advisory Council on Unemploy-
ment Compensation and the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 57-58
(Mar. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Symposium Transcript] (transcript on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (discussing variations in unemploy-
ment compensation laws among the states).
4. See Amy B. Chasanov, Clarifying Conditions for Nonmonetary Eligibility in
the Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 89, 90 (1996).
5. Id. at 91.
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(2) are able to work, available for work, and seeking work.6
Penalties for violating these requirements can range from a
reduction in benefits to complete disqualification for a partic-
ular spell of unemployment.7
This Introduction will review the Symposium sessions which
dealt with eligibility issues. Many of the statements made by
the panel participants and audience members highlighted the
contemporary problems of a system established over sixty
years ago. Thus, this Introduction seeks to record the main
points made during these sessions in an effort to contribute to
the debate regarding reform of the unemployment compensa-
tion system.
I. STATE ADMINISTRATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY
The first session of the Symposium focused on the changing
nature of the work force and its impact on the UI system. It
revealed the extensive changes that have occurred in the
workplace: women have moved into the paid labor market in
greater numbers, contingent workers have become a sizeable
part of the work force, and political pressures have intensified
the drive to cut costs wherever possible.
Walter N. Adams of the Georgia Department of Labor provid-
ed the Symposium with an overview of the gradual tightening
of eligibility and disqualification provisions in Georgia and
discussed the impact of these changes on state trust fund
reserves.8 According to Adams, Georgia legislators funded an
increase in the weekly UI benefit amount by tightening the
eligibility and disqualification rules in order to reduce the
number of beneficiaries.9 Adams concluded, however, that addi-
tional increases in weekly benefits cannot be funded by further
tightening of eligibility requirements. He contended that such
action would not yield any more significant savings and would
probably result in an increase in administrative costs.' °
6. Id.
7. Id. at 94-95.
8. Walter N. Adams, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 35-48.
9. Id. at 34-35, 37-48.
10. Id. at 47-48.
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A Symposium participant added that the economic models
that the Unemployment Insurance Service uses to predict the
costs of the UI program began to break down in the 1980s."
These models could no longer accurately translate the number
of unemployed individuals into the number of unemployment
compensation recipients. 12 Although experts were never able
to explain completely this breakdown, the research of this
Symposium participant revealed that the tightening of non-
monetary criteria for unemployment insurance could not
totally explain the models' inaccuracies because states had
made the most drastic eligibility restrictions during the 1970s,
prior to the effect noticed in the 1980s. 13 Experts hypothesized
that after eligibility requirements were tightened in the 1970s,
individuals learned by experience that fewer people could
qualify for benefits and, thus, fewer people bothered to apply
for benefits. 4
Tightening eligibility requirements may leave particular
social groups out of the UI system. Amy B. Chasanov of the
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation focused on
those groups that are particularly affected by nonmonetary
eligibility requirements. She based her presentation on a
survey performed by the Interstate Conference of Employment
Security Agencies (ICESA).' 5 The results of this survey re-
vealed that individuals in similar situations are often sub-
jected to surprisingly incongruous treatment. For example,
Chasanov indicated that under most state UI systems, an
individual would continue to be eligible for benefits if he
refused a job offer outside of his field of expertise or with a
salary significantly lower than his previous salary, but he
would not be eligible for benefits if he refused a job with hours
that would force him to leave his children unattended at
home.'6
Chasanov found that nonmonetary requirements particularly
affect four groups: women, low-income workers, contingent
workers (part-time, temporary, or commission workers), and
11. Joseph Hight, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 84.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 84-85.
14. See id. at 85-86.
15. Amy B. Chasanov, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 52-65. This
survey was designed to clarify and compare the treatment of individuals in a variety
of situations under the statutes, regulations, and case law of all 50 states. Id. at
52-53.
16. Id. at 58.
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two-worker families.17 For example, because women are more
likely to be the care givers in a family, they are likely to enter
and exit the work force more frequently than men, and thus
are more likely to face difficulties in receiving UI benefits. 8
These difficulties are exacerbated because pregnancy, child
care, and other domestic responsibilities are unlikely to
qualify as "good cause" reasons to leave a job.' 9 Chasanov chal-
lenged policymakers to determine whether the UI system can
be modified to accommodate the groups for whom nonmone-
tary eligibility requirements pose particular difficulties, or
whether other program vehicles must be found to ensure that
the modern worker will receive benefits like those provided
before the establishment of nonmonetary eligibility require-
ments .20
James N. Evatz of the J.C. Penney Company responded to
Chasanov's point that women are more likely than men to be
denied benefits because of their frequent entry into and exit
out of the work force. He countered that perhaps the UI
system is correctly screening out these women because they do
not have a sufficient attachment to the work force.2 ' Evatz
also questioned the ability of the administrative system to
track the legitimacy of some of the disqualifying conditions
that Chasanov criticized.22 For example, he contended that a
state UI office might not be able to verify conditions such as
a lack of affordable child care or the inadequacies of the public
transportation system. He alleged that the UI system cannot
cure many of the problems described by Chasanov, because
they are products of changing social dynamics.23 Moreover,
17. Id. at 60-61.
18. Id. at 59-60.
19. Id. at 62.
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. James N. Evatz, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 70-71. To support
this contention, he cited the conclusion of the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (ACUC) that all states should require beneficiaries to have worked at
least 800 hours per year and to have earned at least the minimum wage in order to
demonstrate an attachment to the work force. Id. at 71. The ACUC projected that
such an adjustment would actually increase the number of individuals eligible for UI
benefits approximately 5.3%. Id. at 71-72; see also ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEM-
PLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES:
BENEFITS, FINANCING, COVERAGE 18 (1995) (recommending that each state should set
its law so that its base period earnings requirements do not exceed 800 times the
state's minimum hourly wage, and so that its high quarter earnings requirements do
not exceed one-quarter of that amount).
22. James N. Evatz, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 72-73.
23. Id. at 73.
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Evatz claimed that employers are already absorbing a number
of costs associated with modern social problems. For example,
he noted that employers must report new hires to assist
authorities in locating individuals with delinquent child sup-
port payments.24 He argued that the government should not
require employers to absorb any more of these social costs.
II. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ELIGIBILITY
AND THE 1990S LABOR FORCE
The unemployment compensation system was designed for
a white middle-class or blue collar worker who was an "ideal
worker," available to work at any time or any place. Yet, the
1994 report of the Advisory Council on Unemployment Com-
pensation (ACUC) stated that "[tiaken together, women, con-
tingent workers, part-time workers, temporary workers, single
heads of households, and single individuals now make up the
majority of workers."25 The second session of the Symposium
focused on the special issues facing women in the work force.26
Such workers do not fit the traditional model and, therefore,
are often denied benefits under the current UI system.
Professor Martin H. Malin discussed the availability of UI
benefits for workers who have lost their jobs because of con-
flicting family responsibilities, or who, after losing their jobs
for other reasons, refuse offers of employment because of
conflicting family responsibilities.2" While such situations
existed during the early years of the UI system, the dramatic
increase in households with two-wage earners and households
headed by a single parent has heightened the significance of
this problem.28 Professor Malin found that the states vary in
their treatment of work-family conflicts and eligibility. 29 Addi-
tionally, under the current system, judges appear to evaluate
the compelling nature of an employee's family needs in light
of their own values.3 °
24. Id. at 73-74.
25. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, REPORT AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS 5 (1994).
26. For another treatment of this issue, see Thompson, supra note 3.
27. Martin H. Malin, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 101.
28. Id. at 102.
29. Id. at 105-08.
30. Id. at 108.
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Professor Malin also argued that fault is a problematic con-
cept in the context of work-family conflicts and unemployment
insurance. He criticized fault as a basis for UT benefits decision
making, pointing out that the concept was inserted into the
early law in order to preserve its constitutionality and only
later increased in importance in the decisional law.31 Professor
Malin argued that the purpose of disqualifying an applicant for
reasons which are arguably the applicant's "fault" is to counter-
act the moral hazard common to all insurance schemes.32 Thus,
Professor Malin proposed that we develop an unemployment
insurance system based explicitly on the risks society believes
are worth insuring against, as well as the countervailing moral
hazard risks.3 3 Professor Malin argued that the current system
promotes undesirable behavior. For example, he noted that the
legal distinction between quitting and being fired gives em-
ployees the wrong incentives. The law may deny an individual
benefits if she agrees to leave a job, but may grant her benefits
if she continues to perform inadequately and is fired. 4 Thus,
the current law actually gives employees an incentive to wait
and get fired rather than inform the employer that they will
no longer be able to fulfill their duties.
Professor Mark R. Brown focused on the specific issue of
pregnancy and unemployment compensation. Although many
states apparently cover pregnancy in their UI laws, these
states still require that beneficiaries be available for work.
This means that a woman may only receive benefits after she
has given birth and once again begins looking for employ-
ment.35 Professor Brown suggested reform of the UI system
that would grant unemployment benefits to all pregnant work-
ers, at least as an experimental approach to this problem.36
Based on data from California's disability system which in-
cludes pregnancy, he predicted the financial costs would equal
only one to five percent of the current cost of unemployment
31. Id. at 109.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 112.
34. Id. at 110.
35. See Mark R. Brown, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 122-23.
36. Id. at 131. A discussant responded that although the likelihood of granting
full benefits to pregnant workers was probably very small, she thought that states
could take smaller steps. For example, states could exclude time spent away from the
work force due to pregnancy when calculating an individual's attachment to the
workforce. Deborah A. Maranville, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 141.
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insurance.17 While Professor Brown conceded that such a sys-
tem would create undesirable incentives, he asserted that the
limited amount of benefits actually received and the limited
length of time such benefits would be provided would neither
be enough to encourage women to have children in order to
receive those benefits nor increase the length of time pregnant
women stay away from the labor market.3"
Deborah A. Maranville of the University of Washington Civil
Law Clinic addressed the significance of temporary and sub-
contracted workers in the labor market. First, she expressed
her concern that under the current system, employers incor-
rectly label workers as contractors in order to avoid financial
contribution obligations. 39 She suggested that the severing of
a traditional employer-employee relationship may no longer be
the appropriate trigger for unemployment benefits and that a
broader concept is needed.40 Second, she indicated that the
presence of temporary employees in the work force requires a
new method of defining availability and involuntary quit
requirements. For example, she suggested that the current
system is counterproductive because it does not encourage
temporary work and that our UI system ought to encourage
people to engage in temporary work between periods of full
employment. 4' She also suggested that the availability of tem-
porary and subcontracted jobs should affect our expectations
of unemployed workers because changing circumstances make
it more realistic to expect all workers to consider temporary or
part-time work when they are unemployed.42
Gerard Hildebrand of the United States Department of
Labor noted that the financing of unemployment benefits could
not be separated from the eligibility issues under discussion.43
He noted that the UI system is employer financed and, thus,
employers may legitimately question whether it is fair for
them to pay for employees' decisions.44 He also expanded on
the presentation of Walter N. Adams, explaining that because
financial resources are limited, increases in the number of
37. Mark R. Brown, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 134-35.
38. Id. at 131.
39. Deborah A. Maranville, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 143.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 143-44.
42. Id. at 144.
43. See id. at 151.
44. See id. at 150.
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beneficiaries will likely result in smaller sums for each benefi-
ciary." Finally, he challenged Professor Brown's conclusion
that states would be able to grant pregnant workers unem-
ployment benefits because his interpretation of the federal
"able and available" requirement4 6 suggests that it would have
to be repealed before Professor Brown's proposal would be
possible.4 v
Members of the audience for Session Two had much to
suggest in response to the presentations of the panel partici-
pants. For example, one audience member suggested that all
workers could contribute a small amount to a fund that would
be available when parents leave the regular work force to care
for children. This fund could be based on the idea that raising
children is also work and that individuals have a right to
compensation during that time. Although the speaker indicat-
ed that this fund might be collected through a tax on workers
rather than through a tax on employers, he reminded the
audience that no matter where the tax is placed, it eventually
affects all system participants.4"
Another audience member proposed a system that would
provide benefits to individuals regardless of the reason for
their separation from the work force, arguing that a substan-
tial savings might result from the reduction in administrative
costs currently used to differentiate qualified beneficiaries
from unqualified beneficiaries.49 Professor Brown responded
that although a similar debate was held in the 1930s, political
realities today would prevent such a system from being enact-
ed because it would be perceived as welfare. 0 Professor Malin
added, however, that the American distinction between "job
losers" and "job leavers" is unusual."' Hildebrand agreed that
for most claimants, the issue of quitting versus being fired is
often a technicality, and that often a claimant's code of ethics
might force him to quit even though the unemployment com-
pensation system punishes him for that action. 2
45. Id. at 150-51.
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 3304.
47. Id. at 153. But see Mark R. Brown, A Case for Pregnancy-Based Unemploy-
ment Insurance, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 41, 68-69 (1996) (arguing that, if the federal
law does require availability, states should still be permitted to provide benefits to
pregnant claimants pre-partum).
48. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 154-56.
49. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 159.
50. Mark R. Brown, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 159.
51. Martin H. Malin, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 160.
52. Id. at 162.
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III. ELIGIBILITY ISSUES FACING SPECIAL GROUPS
While Session Two focused on the degree to which the work
force has changed since the UI system was designed originally,
Session Three presented an example of how little American
society has changed since the 1930s. The UI system may have
inadvertently disregarded the needs of women who participate
in the work force. The Congress that passed the original
unemployment compensation legislation, however, did not
inadvertently create a system which excludes a disproportion-
ate number of jobs held by people of color. 3 Policies based on
racism in the past are still largely in place and receive little
attention as they rarely serve as the subject of legal articles.5 4
Laurence E. Norton II of Texas Rural Legal Aid and Central
Pennsylvania Legal Services began by reminding the audience
that, although Congress created the social welfare programs
of the 1930s with an idea of shared risks, the decision makers
of the day did not include Mexican Americans or African
Americans in their vision of workers who should benefit from
these programs.5 5 As a result, farm workers are not covered by
most of the social welfare programs enacted during that time,
such as the minimum wage law, the federal overtime law, and
the National Labor Relations Act. Norton explained that
employers in the agricultural industry are protected by laws
which insulate them from contributions to the UI system and
from social security taxes. Further, he noted that farm work-
ers must leap higher hurdles before receiving coverage in the
UI system, even though they are more at risk of seasonal
unemployment than most workers."
53. Laurence E. Norton II & Marc Linder, Down and Out in Weslaco, Texas and
Washington, D.C.: Race-Based Discrimination Against Farm Workers Under Federal
Unemployment Insurance, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 177, 190-209 (1996); O'Connell,
supra note 1, at 1448-49.
54. For works that have addressed this issue directly, see JILL QUADAGNO, THE
COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); Marc
Linder, Crewleaders and Agricultural Sweatshops: The Lawful and Unlawful
Exploitation of Migrant Farmworkers, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 213 (1990); Marc
Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in
the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987); Irene Scharf, Preemption by Fiat: The
Department of Labor's Usurpation of Power Over Noncitizen Workers' Rights to
Unemployment Benefits, 56 ALB. L. REV. 561 (1993).
55. Laurence E. Norton II, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 169-70.
56. Id. at 170-72.
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Norton also indicated that many states use a system which
allows agricultural employers to use farm labor contractors in
order to avoid compliance with the UI laws. Although farm
labor contractors are required to adhere to the UI laws, in fact
they do not comply. This non-compliance is due to the struc-
ture of the federal law. The federal law provides that two
requirements must be met before a farm labor contractor is
covered by the UI laws. First, the law requires that the con-
tractor be registered. Second, the law requires that the state
determine that the grower is not an employer.57 States often
overlook this second step thus allowing farm labor contractors
to escape compliance with the law. Norton indicated that even
the ACUC reported these requirements inaccurately, and he
expressed his strong concern that this issue be addressed.5"
Norton projected that covering all farm workers on the same
basis as all other workers would cost growers only an addition-
al one percent of their costs.59 In addition, he noted that
because the costs of covering workers is socialized, growers
would benefit because they would be contributing less, relative
to the benefits received, than many other categories of employ-
ers.60 Norton stated that he believes farmers are opposed to
equal unemployment compensation coverage for farm workers
because they fear that allowing limited unemployment cover-
age might eventually cause other labor laws to be extended to
farm workers.6'
Norton, and his coauthor Professor Marc Linder, researched
the history of the creation of the UI system and learned that
Congress was fully aware of, and in fact intended, the dispa-
rate impact that the agricultural provisions would have on
Mexican American and African American workers.62 He cited
extensive statistics that showed the strong connection between
race and farm worker status at that time, and explained that
although the statute is phrased in terms of agricultural work-
ers, the provisions were targeted at excluding people of color
from the UI system. 63 Today, people of color are still
57. 26 U.S.C. § 3306(o)(1) (1994).
58. Laurence E. Norton II, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 174-75.
59. Id. at 177.
60. Id. Because the agriculture industry experiences higher unemployment rates,
on average, they would benefit from the funds contributed by industries which
experience lower rates.
61. Id. at 177-78.
62. Id. at 178-84.
63. Id. at 178-79.
UC Eligibility
36 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
over-represented in the agricultural work force: African Ameri-
cans, Latinos, and Mexican Americans comprise twenty per-
cent of the total work force, but they comprise seventy to
seventy-five percent of the agricultural work force."
In response to Norton's presentation, Howard Kelly of the
Michigan Farm Bureau shared the views of farmers of the
state of Michigan. First, he outlined the current policy goals
endorsed by the members of the grass-roots Farm Bureau. The
Farm Bureau currently advocates increasing the minimum
payroll threshold for participation in the UI system from
$20,000 to $40,000, in opposition to the $1500 threshold
advocated by Norton and Linder.65 In addition, Kelly stated
that the Farm Bureau does not believe that workers who
"knowingly and willingly work in seasonal employment"
should receive unemployment compensation benefits.6
Kelly indicated that he did not believe that the racism cited
by Norton was a problem in Michigan. He asserted that Michi-
gan is a very popular destination for migrant families because
of the favorable conditions in the state.67 In addition, he men-
tioned a survey conducted in Michigan which found that
migrant families were primarily concerned about housing
conditions, Head Start availability, educational programs,
favorable employer relations, and legal aid services rather
than unemployment benefits.68 He advocated competition
among farmers in providing workers with benefits as a way to
attract the most skilled farm workers. For example, he ex-
plained that Michigan state officials have attempted to show-
case attractive migrant family housing in order to spur other
employers to improve their own housing. 9
During the discussion, an audience member questioned
Kelly on the agricultural industry's position on increasing the
minimum payroll threshold because it would exclude more
farm workers from UI coverage. He asked why the industry
would want to make it almost impossible for workers who
were integral to the industry to receive benefits.7" Kelly
64. Id. at 183.
65. Howard Kelly, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 188; see also Norton
& Linder, supra note 53, at 213-14 (explaining the current requirements for UI
coverage of farm workers and proposing a change in the law).
66. Howard Kelly, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 187.
67. Id. at 189-90.
68. Id. at 190-92.
69. Id. at 193.
70. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 219.
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responded that currently the farm industry contributes to the
system under the law and that his organization arrived at the
$40,000 figure by indexing the $20,000 threshold set in the
1970s. Norton responded by arguing that the fundamental
question was who should bear the risk of unemployment in
this country. He questioned why agricultural workers should
be the only workers who must bear the risk of unemployment
unsupported by the nationwide system.71
Another audience member asked Norton to identify a fund-
ing source to cover the provision of benefits to farm workers.7 2
Norton conceded that covering farm workers would cause an
increase in outlay because farm workers experience higher
levels of unemployment.7 3 He believed, though, that the financ-
ing for farm workers should be accomplished just as it is for
all workers-through socialized employer contributions. In
addition, he noted that some states do cover agricultural
workers, and that this disparity allows Michigan agricultural
employers to escape costs faced by farmers in other states.74
Finally, an audience member asked Norton whether his
proposal included a change in the maximum percentage tax
rate for employers.7 5 This audience member noted that if a
change in the law added the agricultural industry to the UI
system, higher contribution rates might be needed from all
employers to cover the higher rates of unemployment in the
agricultural industry.76 Norton indicated that he had not con-
sidered the maximum employer contribution rate as a part of
his proposal, but that a federally mandated percentage might
be a good proposal because it would prevent states from
competing against each other by trying to undercut other
states' maximum rate.77
71. Laurence E. Norton II, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 221. For an
international perspective on this question, see Clyde W. Summers, Worker Disloca-
tion: Who Bears the Burden? A Comparative Study of Social Values in Five Countries,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033 (1995). For a discussion of debates over unemployment
insurance reform in China and the United States, see Lucy A. Williams & Margaret
Y.K. Woo, The "Worthy" Unemployed: Societal Stratification and Unemployment
Insurance Programs in China and the United States, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457
(1995).
72. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 226.
73. Laurence E. Norton II, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 227.
74. Id.
75. Audience Member, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 231.
76. Id. at 231-32.
77. Laurence E. Norton II, Symposium Transcript, supra note 3, at 231-32.
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CONCLUSION
Insightful discussion about unemployment compensation on
a systemic level is difficult to find.78 The intricacies of a di-
verse federal system often lead to articles designed to help
practitioners benefit their clients under the rules, rather than
articles that provide a broad-ranging policy analysis of UI
theory and its application. We have not often considered the
underlying social values revealed by our collective decisions
regarding the unemployed. In comparison with other welfare
programs, unemployment compensation is supported by a rela-
tively large percentage of the American public because of the
perception that its benefits are "earned" by legitimate partici-
pants in society-workers who are unemployed through no
fault of their own. 9 We have shown our willingness to provide
extensive financial support for Americans who are suffering
short-term income disruption for good reasons. Yet, unemploy-
ment compensation does not serve the members of our society
who are most in need and, at the same time, we continue to
cut back on programs that do assist those who are least able
to help themselves and who are most likely to wind up in
expensive programs of last resort.8 ° It is possible that our
unemployment compensation system guarantees that "Ameri-
ca's public welfare system ... continue[s] to accept private
industry's judgment of a person's worth," by linking benefit
entitlements not only to earning a wage, but also to how much
a person earns.
81
What is the goal of our unemployment compensation sys-
tem? How can we implement the goals of the 1930s without
fundamentally changing the system when the underlying
78. See Stephen A. Mazurak, Foreword, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L. 481, 481 n.3 (1982)
(noting that the last two symposia on unemployment compensation were held in 1955
and 1945).
79. See generally O'Connell, supra note 1, at 1499-1501 (analyzing the theory
that benefits such as UI are earned rights).
80. See generally id. at 1505-24 (comparing the reach of, and ideology behind,
various social welfare programs).
81. Id. at 1525 (quoting BERKOWITZ & MCQUAID, CREATING THE WELFARE STATE:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TWENTIETH CENTURY REFORM 103 (1980)); see also
Martin Feldstein, Unemployment Compensation: Adverse Incentives and Distribu-
tional Anomalies, 27 NAT'L TAx J. 231, 237 (1974) (describing how middle and upper
class families receive most UI benefits).
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factual circumstances have changed? Are the problems faced
by women and people of color problems that can be addressed
by a system which includes a limited view of a deserving
worker? Even if the system is not designed to assist children
in the modern era, would it be better to use this system-one
that is politically accepted and currently in place-to mitigate
some of society's broader inequalities, rather than wait end-
lessly for the day when our nation's leaders adopt enlightened
and well-crafted child-care and migrant worker policies? The
following Articles raise these questions and their concomitant
difficulties, and they propose solutions that may contain some
of the answers. The next challenge will be to move these ideas
from the world of academia into the world of work.

